The Political Economy of Cooperation: A Review of How Political Environments Shape Cooperative Performance in West Bengal

Abstract

Cooperatives have long been recognised as institutional vehicles for rural development, agricultural modernisation, and poverty alleviation. Yet their performance varies dramatically across regions and political contexts. This article examines the political economy of cooperative performance in West Bengal, a state characterised by profound shifts in governance regimes, partisan competition over cooperative institutions, and uneven developmental outcomes. Through a systematic review of peer-reviewed literature, government databases, and case study evidence, this article analyses how political environments shape cooperative functionality, financial sustainability, and member livelihoods. The review finds that political embeddedness operates as a double-edged sword: cooperative performance flourishes when political commitment supports institutional autonomy, capacity building, and accountable governance, but deteriorates rapidly under conditions of partisan capture, leadership suppression, and administrative neglect. Drawing on district-level data from the National Cooperative Database, case studies of dairy cooperatives, producer companies, and Large Area Multipurpose Cooperative Societies (LAMPS), the article identifies critical junctures where political intervention has either strengthened or undermined cooperative outcomes. The findings contribute to broader theoretical debates on institutional economics, collective action, and developmental state capacity, while offering practical implications for cooperative policy design in politically contested environments.